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I. INTRODUCTION
Litigation challenging the legality of an Internal Revenue Service
rule that became final on May 2012 1 has traveled a long, winding, and
contentious path. The IRS rule authorized the distribution of federal
premium assistance tax credits in all health benefits exchanges under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (the “ACA”).
However, potential legal problems with reconciling various sections of
the final legislation involving those tax credits were identified as early as
December 6, 2010. 2 On September 19, 2012, the first of four different
legal challenges to the IRS rule was filed in federal district court in

*

Tom Miller, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute; B.A., 1972, New York
University; J.D., 1975, Duke University.
1
26 C.F.R. §§ 1.36B-1(k), 1.36B-2(a) (2012); Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit,
77 Fed. Reg. 30,378 (May 23, 2012).
2
See Thomas P. Miller, Who’s in Charge? More Legal Challenges to the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Dec. 6, 2010),
http://www.aei.org/press/whos-in-charge-more-legal-challenges-to-the-patientprotection-and-affordable-care-act/.
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Oklahoma. 3 In 2013, subsequent lawsuits were filed in three different
federal district courts in the District of Columbia, Virginia, and Indiana.4
After a mixed record of wins and losses in those lower courts, 5 King v.
Burwell became the first case to reach the Supreme Court.6
Oral argument for King on March 4, 2015, covered the primary
issues outlined in the briefs of the respective parties, involving the
construction and interpretation of the law’s text (e.g., “an exchange
established by the State under [Section] 1311”), the legislative intent of
the Congress that passed the ACA, and whether the various statutory
provisions might be sufficiently ambiguous to require greater deference
to the IRS under step two of review under the so-called Chevron
doctrine. 7
However, two less-discussed issues were injected into the case
during oral argument by somewhat unexpected remarks by Justice
Anthony Kennedy and Chief Justice John Roberts. Justice Kennedy was
concerned that the petitioners’ preferred reading of the statute could raise
serious constitutional problems that involved coercion of, if not lack of
fair notice to, state governments of the heavy burdens they would face if
they decided not to establish their own ACA-qualified health benefits
exchanges. 8 Chief Justice Roberts hinted that any decision to uphold the
IRS rule due to ambiguity in the statute and deference to the executive
branch under Chevron analysis might leave the issue of tax credit
subsidies in federal exchanges subject to reinterpretation by a future
administration. 9
Part II of this essay examines the nature of Justice Kennedy’s
federalism concerns and their possible implications both for the
3

Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt
v. Sebelius, No. CIV-11-030-RAW, 2012 WL 10478689 (E.D. Okla. Sept. 19, 2012).
4
Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F. 3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014); King v. Burwell, No. 14-1158
(4th Cir. 2014); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Judicial Estoppel,
Indiana v. IRS, No. 13-1612 (S.D. Ind., Oct. 8, 2013).
5
Halbig, 758 F.3d at 390; King v. Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 2d 415 (E.D. Va.) aff’d sub
nom., 739 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014) cert. granted, 135 S.Ct. 475, 190 L. Ed. 2d 355
(2014); Oklahoma ex. rel. Pruitt v. Burwell, No. CIV-11-30-RAW, 2014 WL 4854543
(E.D. Okla. Sept. 30, 2014); Motion to Dismiss, Indiana v. I.R.S., No. 13-1612 (S.D. Ind.
Aug. 28, 2014); see Halbig v. Sebelius, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2014).
6
King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014) cert. granted, 135 S.Ct. 475, 190 L.
Ed. 2d 355 (2014).
7
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
8
Transcript of Oral Argument at 16 & 49, King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 475 (Mar. 4,
2015) (No. 14-114).
9
Id. at 76. (Chief Justice Roberts asked Solicitor General Verrilli, “If you’re right – if
you’re right about Chevron, that would indicate that a subsequent administration could
change that interpretation?”)
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upcoming ruling in King v. Burwell and related areas of federal-state
relations. Part III will outline the likely issues behind Chief Justice
Roberts’ remarks, in light of other recent Supreme Court decisions
involving subsequent revisions and “interpretive” changes in federal
rules and regulations, as well as what they may or not be signaling. Part
IV concludes that the shape-shifting nature of the legal arguments
concerning the ACA, as revealed once again in King, leaves both sides of
these issues equally likely to be surprised by the final Court ruling,
probably in late June.

II. THE NEW FRONTIER OF COERCIVE FEDERALISM
During oral argument in King v. Burwell on March 4, 2015, Justice
Kennedy followed up on a point first raised by Justice Sotomayor about
the federal government potentially coercing states in an unconstitutional
manner if the Court accepted the petitioners’ preferred reading of the
ACA. The petitioners argued that the language “established by the State”
in Section 1401(b)(2)(A) of the ACA meant that only state-established
exchanges could gain the benefits of federal premium assistance tax
subsidies. Although predicted by some Court observers as a likely
supporter of the petitioners’ position, Justice Kennedy observed:
Let me say that from the standpoint of the dynamics of
Federalism, it does seem to me that there is something
very powerful to the point that if your argument is
accepted, the States are being told either create your own
Exchange, or we’ll send your insurance market into a
death spiral . . . .It seems to me that under your
argument, perhaps you will prevail in the plain words of
the statute, there’s a serious constitutional problem if we
adopt your argument. 10
During a later portion of oral argument, Justice Kennedy elaborated
on the possible effects of any such unconstitutional coercion in
interpreting the ACA’s statutory text “[I]t does seem to me that if
Petitioners’ argument is correct, this is just not a rational choice for the
States to make and that they’re being coerced . . . .And that you then
have to invoke the standard of constitutional avoidance.” 11 Invoking this
standard could lead the Court to read the applicable statutory text in
favor of the federal government’s (respondents’) position.
10
11

Id.at 16.
Id. at 49.
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The Kennedy line of argument did not arrive out of thin air.
Although some of the elements of “clear notice” and “cooperative
federalism” as part of the statutory interpretation were mentioned in the
respondents’ main brief, 12 these issues and others of constitutional
avoidance and how to interpret statutory text when a federalism question
is at issue were highlighted most prominently in an amici curiae brief
submitted by four professors who teach and write about federalism,
constitutional law, and legislation. 13
As articulated in a number of related articles14 and presentations 15 by
the theory’s primary advocate, professor Abbe R. Gluck of Yale Law
School, the drastic penalty that the petitioners’ reading would impose on
the states did not meet the requisite standard of clarity and fair notice to
the states. Because Congress failed to state clearly any intent to withhold
subsidies from states that did not establish their own exchanges, the ACA
statute should be construed to provide those subsidies to federal
exchange states as well. 16

Coercion or Choice?
However, raising these issues is not the same as winning the final
argument that the ACA statutory provisions in question must necessarily
be interpreted as authorizing tax credits in federal exchanges. A different
view of federalism could conclude that the ACA offered a different kind
of choice to state governments: Establish their own health insurance
exchange or rely on the federal government to do so—under different
terms for each option. States deciding to establish their own exchanges
would gain the benefit of tax credit subsidies for their eligible residents
who enrolled in its coverage, but they also would trigger application of
12

Brief for the Respondents at 38-41, King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 475 (Jan. 21, 2015)
(No. 14-114), 2015 WL 349885.
13
Brief for Professors Thomas W. Merrill, Gillian E. Metzger, Abbe R. Gluck, and
Nicholas Bagley as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents 4–5, 8–9, 11–18, 20, & 23–
24, King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 475 (Jan. 28, 2015) (No. 14-114), 2015 WL 456257.
14
Abbe R. Gluck, How State’s Rights Shapes King v. Burwell, POLITICO, (Mar. 5,
2010), available at http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/03/king-vs-burwellstates-rights-115813.html#.VQHxvmNTfAw; Abbe R. Gluck, King v. Burwell Isn’t
27,
2015),
available
at
About
Obamacare,
POLITICO.(Feb.
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/02/king-v-burwell-states-rights-115550.
html#.VQHymWNTfAw.
15
Thomas P. Miller, Friends and Foes of King v. Burwell: Several More Interesting
Legal and Policy Arguments, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Feb. 23, 2015),
http://www.aei.org/events/friends-foes-king-v-burwell-several-interesting-legal-policyarguments/.
16
Gluck, King v. Burwell Isn’t About Obamacare, supra note 14; Gluck, How State’s
Rights Shapes King v. Burwell, supra note 14.
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the employer mandate to noncomplying larger businesses in their state,
extend the individual mandate’s requirements to many more of those
residents, invite much greater federal involvement in their insurance
markets, and undertake the costs of establishing a state exchange.17
This type of choice does not trigger the same concerns about
coercion of states in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion provisions that were
ruled unconstitutional in NFIB v Sebelius three years ago. 18 That ruling
represented the first significant extension of the Supreme Court’s
Pennhurst “Clear Notice,” or anti-retroactivity doctrine, which held that
Congress must express clearly its intent to impose conditions on the
grant of federal funds to state governments. 19 By requiring notice of the
nature of the states’ obligation in accepting federal program funding, this
rule protects states against federal bait-and-switch tactics that might later
impose a more onerous set of requirements on states already locked into
the program. 20
James Blumstein of Vanderbilt Law School was the primary
architect of the legal argument that succeeded in persuading the Supreme
Court to find the mandatory expansion of Medicaid under the ACA
unconstitutional and then restructure it as a voluntary option for state
governments. 21 He recently distinguished the coercion in the Medicaid
expansion limited in NFIB from the incentives to states to establish
exchanges in King.
First, the states in NFIB were threatened with the loss of all of their
preexisting Medicaid funding if they failed to expand as directed by the
ACA. 22 The Court’s remedy protected all of the states’ money under
“old” Medicaid. Second, in King, the federal government was not using
17

Brief of the Galen Institute and State Legislators as Amici Curiae, in Support of
Petitioners, King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 475 (Dec. 29, 2014) (No. 14-114), 2014 WL
7463544; C. Boyden Gray, Adam White & Adam Gustafson, Did the Challengers in
King Really Ignore Federalism? Their Response, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, WASH. POST
(Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.washingtonpostcom/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/03/03/
did-the-challengers-in-king-really-ignore-federalism-their-response/. Gray, White, and
Gustafson further contend that, in the ACA, Congress failed to adhere to the “clear
statement rule” in the event that it might have wished to modify the longstanding
arrangement under which health insurance remains an area of traditional state concern; at
least in terms of states that declined to establish their own exchanges. Brief of the Galen
Institute at 15–21; see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
18
Jonathan H. Adler, James Blumstein on the King Oral Argument, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/03/05/james-blumstein-on-the-king-oral-argument/.
19
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981).
20
Adler, James Blumstein on the King Oral Argument, supra note 18.
21
Brief of James F. Blumstein as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Fla. v.
Dep’t of Health & Human Serv. (Jan. 17, 2012) (No. 11-400), 2012 WL 195306.
22
Adler, James Blumstein on the King Oral Argument, supra note 18.
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“its power over a preexisting program to leverage participation in a new
program or an unforeseeable expansion of an existing program.” 23
Although the majority of the Court in NFIB was divided in its
rationales for ruling against the terms of the Medicaid expansion, the
more narrow plurality opinion also found that the large expansion in
effect represented an entirely new program in nature and scope.24 Hence,
this Court plurality ruled that states did not have adequate notice when
they first signed up for (original) Medicaid decades ago that they would
be required to expand its scope of coverage by the ACA, as an
unanticipated add-on. The excessive loss of funds did not constitute
unconstitutional coercion in and of itself.25
Blumstein observes that the state exchanges in King involve an
entirely new program. A proper reading of the ACA provisions provides
notice to states that they will have to establish an exchange in order to
gain subsidies for their residents. Moreover, the Obama Administration’s
unilateral extension of the original deadline for establishing a state
exchange 26 means that states are still not foreclosed from reconsidering
their original decision and allowing their residents to qualify for federal
tax credit subsidies. Any alleged lack of notice can be remedied.27
Blumstein concludes that under the petitioners’ interpretation of the
ACA’s subsidy provision, states are the gatekeepers to the federal
subsidy and get to strike their own policy balance between allowing
residents to receive tax credits when purchasing state-exchange-based
insurance and providing businesses in their state with a better business
climate (e.g., relief from the ACA’s employer mandate).28 Although the
federal government could not mandate the states to establish
exchanges, 29 it could try to induce them to do so with the incentive of
federal subsidies.
23

Id.
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2630 (2012); see also
Mayhew v. Burwell, 772 F.3d 80 (1st. Cir. 2014).
25
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2630; see also Mayhew, 772 F.3d 80..
26
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON
EXCHANGES,
MARKET
REFORMS,
AND
MEDICAID,
Dec.
10,
2012,
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/exchanges-faqs-12-102012.pdf.
27
Jonathan H. Adler, James Blumstein on the Administration, the IRS and the ACA:
Will the Courts Rein in the President’s Pen?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, WASH. POST (Feb.
27, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/02/27/theadministration-the-irs-and-the-aca-will-the-courts-rein-in-the-presidents-pen/.
28
Adler, James Blumstein on the King Oral Argument, supra note 18.
29
Id.; Adler, James Blumstein on the Administration, the IRS and the ACA: Will the
Courts Rein in the President’s Pen?, supra note 27; see Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tit. I, § 1311, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012)).
24
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Avoiding Spillover Effects
The petitioners have other rebuttals to the coercive federalism claims
of the federal government and its allies in King. For example, the NFIB
decision regarding Medicaid found no constitutional problems with
conditioning new federal funds (at an even higher matching rate than the
existing Medicaid program) upon states agreeing to participate in the
expanded portion of the Medicaid program. 30 Similarly, there should be
no constitutional problems if the ACA provisions are read as authorizing
the federal government to offer new tax subsidies to residents in states
that agree to participate in a new program by establishing their own
ACA-qualified exchanges. Offering to hand out new money is not the
same as threatening to take away existing funding.
On the other hand, striking down this conditional offer of funding as
unconstitutionally coercive to states might well jeopardize a host of other
existing federal-state grant-in-aid programs based on some form of
conditionality (e.g., No Child Left Behind 31). Perhaps that accounts for
how Solicitor General Donald Verrilli responded, when asked by Justice
Alito during oral argument whether he agreed that “If we adopt
Petitioners’ interpretation of this Act, is it unconstitutionally coercive?” 32
Verrilli said, “I think that it would be—certainly be a novel constitutional
question, and I think that I’m not prepared to say to the Court today that
it is unconstitutional.” 33
Moreover, any possible ruling that the statutory text clearly limits the
ACA premium subsidies only to state-established exchanges, but does so
in a way that is unconstitutionally coercive, is more likely to result in
invalidating those tax credits for all fifty states, rather than authorizing
them to be extended (contrary to congressional intent) even to states that
have declined to receive them, by failing to establish their own
exchanges. 34 Indeed, such an interconnected scheme of coercion could
inevitably put in jeopardy the related ACA provisions for federal
insurance regulation in Title I of the ACA (e.g., guaranteed issue and
adjusted community rating) that could cause the coercion due to the
prospects of death spirals in the insurance markets of states without

30

Mayhew, 772 F.3d at 91–92.
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified at
20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2001)).
32
Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, supra note 8.
33
Id. at 49.
34
Joshua Blackman, Federalism Will Sink, not Save, Obamacare, NAT’L REV., (Mar.
10, 2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/415130/federalism-will-sink-not-saveobamacare-josh-blackman.
31
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exchange tax credits. 35 After all, Justice Kennedy previously joined three
other justices in NFIB in concluding that (1) the unconstitutionally
coercive Medicaid provisions could not be severed and the entire
Medicaid expansion must be stricken down, and (2) unconstitutional
invalidity of both the Medicaid expansion and the individual mandate
required invalidating the entire law as non-severable. 36
Before going too far down the fair notice trail, it is also important to
remember that seven states filed amici briefs in support of the petitioners
in King, essentially saying that they were aware of how the tax credit
subsidies were conditioned under the ACA and that they still chose not to
establish their own state exchanges. 37 States knew, or should have
known, before the initially extended deadline date of December 14,
2012, for deciding whether to establish exchanges under the ACA, that
the IRS rule had been challenged in public comments when first
proposed in August 2011 and the State of Oklahoma had challenged the
final rule in federal district court on September 19, 2012. 38

Regulating State Residents vs. Conditioning Funding for State
Governments
Finally, the degree to which unconstitutional coercion claims can be
stretched to cover particular states claiming injury due to the ACA’s
exchange funding provisions remains in doubt. The primary obstacle is
that the alleged coercion involves the threat of imposing a federal
scheme of regulation on states that fail to establish their own exchange.
Under the petitioners’ preferred reading of the ACA statute, this means
that those states’ residents do not gain the benefit of federal tax credits,

35

Joshua Blackman, Avoiding Constitutional Avoidance, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY,
WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2015/03/04/avoiding-constitutional-avoidance.
36
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. 2566.
37
Brief of the State of Oklahoma, Alabama, Georgia, Nebraska, South Carolina, and
West Virginia, as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 15, King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct.
475 (Dec. 29, 2014) (No. 14-114), 2014 WL 7463546. Brief of Amici Curiae State of
Indiana and 39 Indiana Public School Corporations in Support of Petitioners at 21, King
v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 475 (Dec. 29, 2014) (No. 14-114), 2014 WL 7463545.
38
David Oedel, A Response to Justice Kennedy from the Heart of Georgia, MACON
MONITOR (Mar. 9, 2015), http://maconmonitor.com/2015/03/09/a-response-to-justicekennedy-from-the-heart-of-georgia-what-would-georgia-do-if-the-supreme-court-ruledagainst-forcing-federal-subsidies-through-state-health-insurance-exchanges-t/
(citing
2011-36 I.R.B.; Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note
3). The deadline subsequently was unilaterally postponed. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID SERVICES, supra note 26.
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but their states’ insurance markets nevertheless may be subject to
destabilizing burdens of other ACA insurance regulation.
The first rebuttal to this scenario of unconstitutional coercion
imposed on non-complying states is that it does not fit the model of past
Supreme Court findings of conditional federal spending programs that
may be constitutionally problematic. Several legal scholars have noted
that New York v. United States has already distinguished between the
latter and other congressional efforts (such as in the ACA) to use federal
regulatory authority to encourage state cooperation.39 The key portion of
the Court’s opinion by Justice O’Connor in New York explained:
The affected States are not compelled by Congress to
regulate, because any burden caused by the State’s
refusal to regulate will fall on those who generate waste
and find no outlet for its disposal, rather than on the
State as a sovereign. A State whose citizens do not wish
it to attain the Act’s milestones may devote its attention
and
its resources to issues its citizens deem more
worthy; the choice remains at all times with the residents
of the State, not with Congress. The State need not
expend any funds, or participate in any federal program,
if local residents do not view such expenditures or
participation as worthwhile. 40
Jonathan Adler of Case Western Reserve Law School observes that
the practice of incentivizing states to cooperate with a state
implementation plan in accord with particular federal regulatory goals,
under the threat of imposing “differential, and more draconian,
regulatory burdens on private firms within non-cooperating states,” is a
common practice in regulatory extensions of the Clean Air Act. 41 This
practice of burdening a state’s residents, rather than its government, has
yet to be challenged successfully as unconstitutionally burdensome for
the latter. Ilya Somin of George Mason Law School adds that “current
state coercion precedents apply only to conditions attached to federal
spending grants to state governments.” 42 However, the ACA exchange
39

See infra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174 (1992).
41
Jonathan Adler, Could King v. Burwell Overturn Parts of New York v. United
States?,VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/03/05/could-king-v-burwell-overturn-parts-ofnew-york-v-united-states/.
42
Ilya Somin, Federalism Arguments in King v. Burwell, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY,
WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2015/03/07/federalism-arguments-in-king-v-burwell/ (emphasis added).
40
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coverage provisions in question in King involve the threat of increased
regulation, imposed on the residents of a given state, as an incentive for
that state to agree to similar regulation on its own (including the ACA’s
employer mandate and a more comprehensive individual mandate).
Moreover, the tax credit grants in King instead go to private individuals
(actually, to private insurers by way of private individual enrollees in
qualified, exchange-based coverage).

Political Accountability
If the ACA’s exchange coverage provisions are read as treating
federal exchanges as also eligible for tax credit subsidies, then noncomplying states would end up with an even larger federal role in their
health insurance markets than they tried to choose to avoid. Expanding
the scope of federal involvement in more traditional areas of state-level
regulation, rather than restricting it when states chose that option, does
not seem like much relief from the original version of the purported
coercion. 43
One of the core premises of the finding of coercion behind the
Medicaid expansion provisions in NFIB v. Sebelius was ensuring
political accountability by the federal government and state governments,
respectively. 44 However, even if one accepts the premise that limiting
federal tax credits only to exchanges established by states would impose
unconstitutional coercion against other states not doing so, should it then
trigger the theory of constitutional avoidance to read the ACA provisions
differently in order to avert that problem? This approach would appear to
erode accountability for states that chose not to establish exchanges on
their own and allow the federal government to achieve its exchange
coverage goals without having to pre-empt some states’ decisions more
explicitly (with an expansion of federal regulation) or even try to
mandate state regulation. Moreover, as many as thirty-seven states

43
See Ilya Somin, Federalism, Coercion, and King v. Burwell, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY,
WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2015/03/07/federalism-coercion-and-king-v-burwell-a-response-to-rick-hills/.
44
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. 2566. As Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in
his controlling opinion,
Spending Clause programs do not pose this danger of coercion when
a State has a legitimate choice whether to accept the federal
conditions in exchange for federal funds. In such a situation, state
officials can fairly be held politically accountable for choosing to
accept or refuse the federal offer. But when the State has no choice,
the Federal Government can achieve its objectives without
accountability . . . .
Id. at 2602–2603.
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decided not to establish fully ACA-compliant state exchanges on their
own (for the 2014 plan year). 45 They still are not foreclosed from
establishing those exchanges in future years, in order to allow their
residents to qualify for a subsidy under the King petitioners’ reading of
the ACA. Hence, those states can either remedy any alleged lack of
notice about the consequences of not establishing an exchange or take
political accountability for deciding not to do so.46

Requiring Perpetual Maintenance of Effort in State Medicaid
Programs?
The next ripple ahead from Justice Kennedy’s concerns over
constitutional coercion problems (in the event that the ACA’s tax credits
are interpreted as being limited only to exchanges established by state
governments) involves the former’s interaction with another section of
the law concerning Medicaid Maintenance of Effort (MOE). This section
provides that the “General Requirement to Maintain Eligibility Standards
Until State Exchange Is Fully Operational” runs from the date of
enactment of the ACA [March 23, 2010] and does not end until the
Secretary of HHS determines that an Exchange established by the State
under Section 1311 is fully operational.47 Consider what this might mean
if the petitioners’ position prevails in King, to the effect that “an
exchange established by the State under [Section] 1311” narrowly
defines exchanges established by states, but not by the HHS Secretary, as
the only type of exchange eligible for premium tax credit subsidies
determined under Section 1401 of the ACA. The next round of lawsuits
involving unconstitutional coercion stemming from the King case then
could involve how the Medicaid program’s condition for complying with
this MOE requirement is that a state first establishes the same type of
exchange that it needs to make its residents eligible for exchange
coverage tax credits. In that event, the penalty for failing to comply with
the MOE requirement would be severe—losing eligibility to receive any
Federal [Medicaid] payments under 42 U.S.C. 1903(a). 48 Moreover, this
45

KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, STATE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACE
TYPES, 2015,
http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-health-insurance-marketplace-types/.
46
See Jonathan Adler, Federalism, Coercion, and King v. Burwell, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY, WASH. POST (February 27, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/02/27/the-administration-the-irs-and-the-aca-will-the-courtsrein-in-the-presidents-pen/.
47
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. Law. No. 111–148, tit. I,
124 Stat. 275 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(gg)(1)) (adding a new
subsection for “Maintenance of Effort”).
48
Id.
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MOE requirement is written into the ACA as perpetual, with no date at
which it ends. 49
How would states without state-established exchanges (after
December 31, 2013) be treated regarding their MOE requirements for
their old, non-expanded Medicaid program? As of the time of the
Supreme Court’s review of King v. Burwell, very informal unpublished
“guidance” from HHS to several states seeking to make changes in their
pre-ACA Medicaid programs suggested that the federal government was
interpreting this section to end MOE in any state with an operational
exchange; not just those with more narrowly defined “state-established”
ones. 50 This legal interpretation would no longer appear to be valid, in
the event that the petitioners’ definition of state-established exchanges
prevails in King.
Whether a future court might strike down this even-stronger MOE
requirement as unconstitutionally coercive, of course, is speculative at
this point. However, the MOE requirement that states must freeze key
portions of their Medicaid program eligibility rules forever—if they fail
to establish an exchange—appears to impose disastrous penalties if the
latter do not comply (loss of all federal Medicaid funds), and those states
would remain at risk of triggering this penalty forever. 51 States could also
argue that they are being coerced into participating in a “new”
program—the ACA’s exchange coverage—in order to avoid triggering
the MOE requirement after December 31, 2013. 52
An early preview of a different application of the ACA’s MOE
requirements for a different part of the Medicaid program is provided by
Mayhew v. Burwell. 53 In that case, Maine attempted to amend its state
plan for Medicaid in August 2012, arguing that the NFIB decision had
freed it from any further MOE eligibility restrictions involving various
optional population categories.54 Then-HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius
approved some of the proposed changes, but disapproved the state’s plan
to drop Medicaid coverage of 19- and 20-year old children in lowincome families. 55 This ruling relied on another type of Medicaid MOE
provision within the ACA, which required states accepting Medicaid
funds to maintain their Medicaid eligibility standards for children until
49

Id.
See Virgil Dickson & Lisa Schencker, Premium Subsidies Case Could End Federal
Medicaid Funding in Many States, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Mar. 6, 2015),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150306/NEWS/150309926/premiumsubsidies-case-could-end-federal-medicaid-funding-in-many.
51
See supra text accompanying notes 47–49.
52
See Mayhew, 772 F.3d at 83.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 89.
55
Id.
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October 1, 2019. 56 Maine subsequently challenged this decision in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, alleging among other reasons
that, in light of the recent NFIB v. Sebelius ruling on the ACA’s
proposed Medicaid expansion, enforcement of the MOE provision in this
case was unconstitutionally coercive in violation of the Spending Clause
of the U.S. Constitution. 57
On November 17, 2014, a three-judge panel denied Maine’s petition
for review and found no constitutional violation.58 The State filed a
petition for certiorari at the U.S. Supreme Court on February 12, 2015. 59
Several aspects of this case distinguish it from any possible future
challenge to the other type of Medicaid MOE requirement in the ACA.
The First Circuit court noted that, in 2009, Maine agreed to continue
providing coverage (as it had since 1991), for low-income individuals
aged eighteen to twenty, through the end of 2010. 60 Maine actually was
required to do so in order to receive economic stimulus funds (including
a higher federal funds matching rate for Medicaid spending) under the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). 61 However,
the ACA was enacted on March 23, 2010, with a different MOE
provision regarding Medicaid eligibility for any child under nineteen
years of age (or such higher age as the State may have elected).62 The
Maine Department of Health and Human Services complained that it did
not have the opportunity to restrict its eligibility standards for children
after it accepted the ARRA stimulus funds but before the ACA went into
effect. 63 (Maine did opt not to participate in the ACA’s Medicaid
expansion). Its lawsuit argued that application of the MOE restriction to
its proposed eligibility changes were unconstitutionally coercive under
NFIB and violated the anti-retroactivity principle in Pennhurst. 64
The First Circuit court in Mayhew read the NFIB ruling narrowly, in
accord with the plurality opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts. 65
Hence, both the First Circuit and the Supreme Court’s finding of
unconstitutional coercion required two components for a Spending
56

See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(gg) (2014)
Mayhew, 772 F.3d 80.
58
Mayhew, 772 F.3d 80.
59
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mayhew, 772. F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2014), petition for
cert. filed (U.S. Feb. 20, 2015) (No. 14-992).
60
Mayhew, 772 F.3d at 88.
61
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–5, 123 Stat.
115 (codified at various sections throughout 42 U.S.C.).
62
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–5, 123 Stat.
115 (codified at various sections throughout 42 U.S.C.).
63
Mayhew, 772 F.3d at 88.
64
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 453 U.S. at 25.
65
Mayhew, 772 F.3d at 86–87.
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Clause violation: It involved continued receipt of pre-ACA Medicaid
funding conditioned on participation in an entirely new (expanded)
Medicaid program, and the threatened loss of such funding would be so
consequential to states that they had no real option to refuse.66 “[T]he
expansion placed a condition on the receipt of funds that did not govern
the use of those funds and . . . the condition was unduly coercive.” 67
The First Circuit court viewed the challenged Maine provision as an
“unexceptional ‘alteration’” of the state’s Medicaid program, rather than
a “new” program. 68 It also noted that the MOE requirement involved
here only applied to children—a shift in degree rather than in kind—
(same funding mechanism, same current benefits), and it would last for
just nine years. 69
If and when the Supreme Court decides to accept review of this case,
it may not view the MOE restriction imposed on Maine so permissively.
The State has a point that it no longer was gaining any benefits (like the
stimulus funds) after 2010 in return for maintaining optional coverage of
18- and 19-year olds. Also at issue might be whether the nine-year lock
in under the ACA’s MOE was a foreseeable, modest change for a
“limited” period of transition time. 70
More significantly, any final ruling in King that finds that tax credits
are only available in states that have established their own ACAqualified exchanges is much more likely to trigger challenges to the
broader MOE requirement for state Medicaid programs, because the
latter are open-ended for states without such exchanges. Locking in a
state’s Medicaid eligibility standards forever, unless it decides either to
establish an exchange or risk the loss of all of its future Medicaid
funding, appears to represent federal coercion of a different dimension. 71
However, other states that have already made changes in their Medicaid
eligibility standards since March 2010—with the approval of HHS—may
be allowed some transition time to re-establish their previous ones, to
avoid such risks.

66

Id. at 88.
Id.
68
Id. at 89.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 94.
71
See Ralph Lindeman, PPACA Opponents Eyeing New Challenges to Law’s
Maintenance-of-Effort Requirements, 21 HEALTH L. REP. 1239 (2012). For an earlier,
more limited preview of this possible line of argument from states seeking relief from the
broader MOE requirement for coverage eligibility involving adults, see also Abby
Goodnough & Robert Pear, Maine Debate Hints at Rift on Medicaid after Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2012, at A14.
67
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III. DEFERENCE TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, OR TO CONGRESS?
Near the end of Solicitor General Verrilli’s portion of oral argument,
Chief Justice Roberts suddenly raised a new question about possible
Chevron deference (due to ambiguity or irreconcilable conflict in various
provision of the ACA) to the Obama Administration’s Internal Revenue
interpretation of what “an Exchange established by the State” means:
“[I]f you’re right about Chevron, that would indicate that a subsequent
administration could change that interpretation?”72
The Roberts question quickly triggered speculation in both directions
as to what it might have signaled regarding his thinking on whether to
apply Chevron deference to the administration’s interpretation of
exchange-related tax credit provisions in the ACA statute. One line of
thinking, as noted by Adam White, was that Roberts was challenging the
Solicitor General’s rationale for first invoking such discretion under the
second step of Chevron-style analysis of an administrative rule, but then
suggesting the future burden would be high to reverse this interpretation
in a new administration: “For if [the Solicitor General is] suggesting that
stakes are too high for a future administration to change course, then he
only confirms Justice Kennedy’s concern that it strains credulity to
suggest that Congress could have entrusted such a significant policy
question to the IRS to decide unilaterally.” 73
To place this issue within context of evolving Supreme Court case
law, one might begin with a pre-Chevron ruling involving a Reagan
Administration effort to rescind an existing regulation to require seatbelts
or airbags in new automobiles. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association v. State Farm, a divided Court held that the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s rescission of the passive
restraint requirement in Modified Standard 208 was “arbitrary and
capricious” and “the agency failed to present an adequate basis and
explanation for rescinding” the requirement. 74 Therefore, it must either
consider the matter further or adhere to or amend the Standard along

72

Transcript of Oral Argument at 76, supra note 8.
Adam J. White, The Roots of Roberts’ Remark in King v. Burwell, WKLY.
STANDARD, (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.weeklystandard.com/keyword/King-v.-Burwell;
see also Rachel S. Karas, Chief Justice Questions Utility of Chevron Ruling in ACA
Subsidies Case, INSIDE HEALTH POL’Y, (Mar. 6, 2015) (suggesting that the words of
justices Roberts, Alito, and Kennedy during oral argument reflect worry that resorting to
a Chevron “step two” ruling that deferred to the IRS interpretation of the law as not
“unreasonable” in King could have serious consequences for future legal readings of the
same provisions by another administration).
74
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 34
(1983).
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lines which its analysis supports. 75 This requirement for a “reasoned
analysis” that was neither arbitrary nor capricious still allowed some preChevron room for changes in previous agency rules. 76
Chevron and its new rules of greater deference to executive branch
rulemaking in cases of statutory ambiguity was decided in 1984.77 The
next notable evolution in the Court’s view of executive branch discretion
appeared in National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand
X Internet Services, 78 involving the proper regulatory classification of
broadband internet service. The Court noted that “agency inconsistency
is not a basis for declining to analyze an agency’s interpretation under
the [more permissive] Chevron framework” 79; although “unexplained”
inconsistency may in some cases provide a basis for finding a new
“interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency
practice under the Administrative Procedure Act.” 80 It found in Brand X
that “the Communications Act is ambiguous about whether cable
companies ‘offer’ telecommunications with cable modem service.”81
Silence under the Act suggested that the FCC “has the discretion to fill
the consequent statutory gap.” 82
Justice Thomas wrote that “[w]e also conclude that the
Commission’s construction was ‘a reasonable policy choice for the
[Commission] to make’ at Chevron’s second step . . . .[t]he Commission
is free within the limits of reasoned interpretation to change course if it
adequately justifies the change.’” 83 He added that “[a]ny inconsistency
bears on whether the Commission has given a reasoned explanation for
its current position, not on whether its interpretation is consistent with
the statute.” 84
Another extension of executive branch discretion under Chevron
analysis involved FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (often referred to
as Fox I). 85 In this case, the Federal Communications Commission had
decided to modify its indecency enforcement regime to regulate so-called
fleeting expletives. Justice Scalia concluded that there was no basis in the
75

Id.
Id. at 42.
77
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
78
Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 975
(2005).
79
Id. at 981.
80
Id.
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Id. at 992.
82
Id. at 997.
83
Id.
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Id. at 1020 n.4.
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Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n et al. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., et al., 556 U.S. 502
(2009).
76
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Communications Act or the Supreme Court’s opinions “for a
requirement that all agency change be subjected to more searching
review.” 86
Although an [executive branch] agency must ordinarily
display awareness that it is changing position . . . and
may sometimes need to account for prior factfinding or
certain reliance interests created by a prior policy, it
need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the
reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for
the old one. 87
The ruling concluded that “[i]t suffices that the new policy is permissible
under the statute, that there are good reasons for it [(i.e., the decision to
modify is neither arbitrary nor capricious)], and that the agency believes
it to be better, which the conscious change adequately indicates.” 88
Perhaps to complete this trilogy of extensions of agency interpretive
discretion under Chevron, the Court on March 9 upheld in Perez,
Secretary of Labor, et al. v. Mortgage Bankers Association et al. that the
power of an administrative agency to change an “interpretive” rule that it
had previously issued, without being required to follow the note-andcomment rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). 89 In this case, the Department of Labor had issued letters in 1999
and 2001 opining that mortgage-loan officers do not qualify for the
administrative exemption to overtime pay requirements under the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938. 90 After the Department reissued new
regulations regarding the exemption in 2004, it once again altered its
interpretation of the administrative exemption in 2010—without notice
or opportunity for comment. 91 The Court’s majority opinion by Justice
Sotomayor pointed out that the APA categorically exempts interpretive
rules from the notice-and-comment process, although agencies must use
the same procedures when they amend or repeal a rule as they used to

86

Id. at 502–503.
Id. at 503 (internal citations omitted).
88
Id. at 515. A later ruling in this continuing legal saga, authored by Justice Kennedy
in 2012, found that because “the [FCC] failed to give Fox or ABC fair notice prior to the
broadcasts in question that fleeting expletives and momentary nudity could be found
actionably indecent, the Commission’s standards as applied to these broadcasts were
vague . . . and the Commission’s orders must be set aside.” Fed. Commc’n Comm’n v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 2307, 2320 (2012).
89
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S.Ct. 1199, 1201 (2015).
90
Id. at 1204–05.
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Id.
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issue the rule. 92 Although the Court’s Perez decision initially generated a
ripple of speculation that it might have been foreshadowed by Chief
Justice Roberts’ comments during the King oral argument, it remains
more distinguishable from the latter case. Interpretive rules do not have
the force and effect of law.93 They also remain subject to the constraints
of “arbitrary and capricious” standard.94 That includes the requirement
that an agency “provide more substantial justification when ‘its new
policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those which underlay its
prior policy; or when its prior policy has engendered serious reliance
interests that must be taken into account.’”95 Moreover, although the
precise definition of interpretive rules may remain a continuing topic of
debate, in the Perez case the petitioner had waived the argument that the
2010 Department of Labor interpretation should be classified as a
legislative rule. 96
In this broader context of more recent Supreme Court decisions
involving administrative agency discretion in modifying or even
discarding previous rules, the brief comments of Chief Justice Roberts in
King may have echoed his earlier dissent in City of Arlington v. FCC:
[T]he danger posed by the growing power of the
administrative state cannot be dismissed . . . the citizen
confronting thousands of pages of regulations—
promulgated by an agency directed by Congress to
regulate, say, ‘in the public interest’—can perhaps be
excused for thinking that it is the agency really doing the
legislating. 97
From one perspective, Chief Justice Roberts may have been
signaling to Justice Kennedy and the Solicitor General during the King
oral argument that it was unwise in this case to resort to the deference to
agency discretion provided by Chevron analysis. An issue of such
magnitude that involves the possible additional expenditure of tens of
billions of taxpayer dollars should not be left to IRS discretion, and it
would be better instead to determine the clear meaning of the words that
Congress used in approving the ACA in 2010. The 2012 IRS rule in
question appears to be much closer to a legislative than an interpretive
rule as well (having gone through the full notice-and-comment process
92
93
94
95
96
97

Id. at 1206.
Id. at 1203–04; but see id. at 1211 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 1209.
Id. (citing Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n et al., 556 U.S. at 515).
Id. at 1210.
City of Arlington v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 133 S.Ct. 1863, 1878 (2013).
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before becoming final). Determining the meaning of “established by the
State” under Chevron step one not only would return political
accountability to the Congress; it would put the Court’s decision on more
favorable ground for the petitioners.
On the other hand, Chief Justice Roberts surprised observers in the
NFIB ruling with a different type of deference to the political branches of
the federal government, in finding a way to avoid a ruling that would
overturn the entire ACA as unconstitutional. He might instead have been
foreshadowing in King that his vote will be more likely to defer to the
future politics of control of the executive branch (which could reexamine the IRS rule), rather than to the legislative workings of
Congress. Even if the Chief Justice has decided to defer, we won’t know
in which direction he has decided to kick the issue to another branch of
government, at least until the Court issues its ruling in King in late June.
“It ain’t over ‘til it’s over,”98 but we may not yet know when that truly is
the case for the larger legal, legislative, and political issues behind this
litigation.

IV. THE WAR OF THE WORDS CONTINUES
The multiple rounds of litigation over whether an IRS rule properly
authorized tax credits for federal exchange coverage under the ACA have
involved more than just the four words “established by the State” that are
highlighted in King v. Burwell. A quick search through the appellate
briefs and oral argument transcripts in that case and related ones will find
differing interpretations of the meaning and significance of other words
and phrases in the statutory text (e.g., “such” exchange,” “within” a state,
“qualified individual,” “coverage month,” reporting information, and
even “final” regulations).99
The oral argument on March 4, 2015, added greater emphasis on
related judicial doctrines of fair notice, cooperative federalism,
unconstitutional coercion, Chevron deference, and political
accountability. But not every set of tentative thoughts during such

98
Quote from Yogi Berra, 1973, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/it’s+never+
over+till+it’s+over.
99
See, e.g., Brief of Respondents, supra note 12 at 13, 22, & 24 (interpreting “such
exchange”); id. at 14, 27-29, & 52-53 (interpreting “qualified individual”); id. at 26
(interpreting “reporting information”); Brief for Petitioners at 3, 18-19, & 30, King v.
Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 475 (Dec. 22, 2014) (No. 14-114), 2014 WL 7386999 (interpreting
“coverage months”); id. at 2 & 11 (interpreting “within the state”); id. at 7 (interpreting
“final regulations”); Reply Brief at 6 & 18 King v. Burwell, 135 S.Ct. 475 (Feb. 18,
2015) (No. 14-114), 2015 WL 737858 (interpreting “within a State”).
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questions and comments will survive the difficult process of finding a
Court majority for a final ruling.
For example, even Justice Kennedy signaled several second thoughts
and limits on his initial musing during the March oral argument about a
potentially serious constitutional question involved in the petitioners’
reading of the ACA statutory text concerning the availability of tax
credits in federal exchanges: “It may well be that you’re correct as to
these words, and there’s nothing we can do. I understand that.” 100
Even several weeks after oral argument concluded, another potential
surprise surfaced during Justice Kennedy’s testimony before a
congressional committee regarding the Supreme Court’s 2016 budget
request and related issues of court administration in the face of
congressional gridlock.
We routinely decide cases involving federal statutes, and
we say, “Well, if this is wrong the Congress will fix it.”
But then we hear Congress can’t pass a bill one way or
the other, that there’s gridlock. And some people say,
“Well that should affect the way we interpret the
statutes.” That seems to me a wrong proposition. We
have to assume that we have three fully functioning
branches of the government, that are committed to
proceed in good faith and with good will toward one
another to resolve the problems of this republic. 101
So, let the speculation continue whether those comments do or do
not suggest which way Justice Kennedy is likely to have already voted in
King v. Burwell. We should expect more dissenting and concurring
opinions, and a few more surprises ahead, rather than any clear and
uniform statements by a strong majority of the justices in this closely
divided case.
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Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 8, at 18.
Notable and Quotable: Anthony Kennedy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2015, at A15.

